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If ‘a week is a long time in politics’, as famously
uttered by Harold Wilson in 1964, then certainly two
years would appear to be a long time in demography
and planning. The official sub-national projections 
for England released two years ago indicated that
London’s population would be 10.96 million in 2039,
how many extra
people should
london be
planning for? 
Tony Champion looks at why the ONS population projections for
London released in May indicate a considerably lower increase
than its previous set did two years ago, discusses how much faith
should be placed in the latest figures, and points to consequent
uncertainty about the rate of growth in other parts of the country
The latest ONS population projections suggest a much smaller rise in London’s population compared with its
previous set two years ago
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whereas the figure in the new projections for 2041
released by the Office for National Statistics (ONS)
in May1 is 10.35 million. This is a substantial change
with potentially important consequences for the
draft new London Plan, which is predicated on 
the figure of 10.78 million for 2041.2 Also, to the
extent that the change reflects altered assumptions
about migration in and out of the capital, there are
implications for other parts of the country. The aim
in this article is to provide more information about
these projections so as to try to help planners
decide how best to react.
To set the context, our starting point is provided by
Table 1, which gives the population totals for London,
defined as the Greater London Authority (GLA) area
and statistical region, and for good measure includes
the 2012-based projections data as well as those for
the two subsequent (2014-based and 2016-based)
sets. The table covers the full 25-year projection
period for each one, running to 2037, 2039 and 2041,
respectively, and also gives the figures for the other
sets’ start and end years as appropriate in order to
get a better handle on the differences between them.
The key features of this table are the following.
The last but one line reiterates the big drop in
London’s projected growth expected for the full 25-
year projection period between the 2014-based and
latest set, down by some 860,000 people, whereas
between the 2012- and 2014-based series the 25-
year growth number had been raised, albeit only by
some 80,000. Meanwhile, the table’s bottom line
shows the growth expected for the 21-year period
covered by all three projections, with the first
indicating that London’s population in 2037 would
be 1.90 million higher than in 2016, the second
putting the increase just a bit larger at 1.99 million,
but the latest set reducing this to 1.37 million, a
cutback of over 600,000 or 31%.
How these changes have come about can partly
be understood by reference to the upper parts of
the table. It looks as if between 2012 and 2014
things developed pretty much on target, with the
8.54 million starting population for the 2014-based
set being only marginally above the 8.53 million
projected by the 2012-based set for 2014. Even by
2037, the new projection of 10.82 million was only
1.5% larger than the 10.66 million given by the 2012-
based series.
In that context, the difference between the 2014-
based and the latest projections is in marked
contrast, not only in scale but also because the
trend is in the opposite direction. Part of the
explanation for this can be seen to lie in the latter’s
starting population in 2016 being below what was
projected for then by the 2014-based set, which in
turn can be put down to two factors. One is a real
slowdown in London’s overall growth over these
two years. The other arises from recent changes 
in ONS methodology that in combination have
resulted in a downward revision of the estimate of
London’s starting population in 2016. Both of these
changes have then fed through into the numbers
projected forward to 2041 and now give just a
50,000 a year increase towards the end of this
Source: Calculated from ONS data. The starting-year population estimates are in bold, whereas the other figures are projections
or calculations derived from these. Each number is rounded to the nearest thousand, so the change data may not sum exactly
2012
2014
2016
2037
2039
2041
Change
Full 25 years
2016-37
8,308
8,531
8,759
10,662
2,354
1,903
8,539
8,832
10,820
10,976
2,437
1,988
8,770
10,142
10,245
10,346
1,576
1,372
2012-based
thousands
2014-based
thousands
2016-based
thousands
Table 1
London’s population as projected by the latest three official population projection series
Year Population
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period, rather than the 75,000 annual increase
indicated by the 2014-based set.
What lies behind the changes between the two
latest sets of projections can best be explained by
reference to the four main demographic components
of change – namely births, deaths, international
migration, and internal (within-UK) migration. For
this purpose, we narrow down the focus to the first
ten years covered by the 2016-based projections, 
as this is of most immediate interest for planning
policy, and compare this with the same ten years 
of numbers from the 2014-based series, namely
2016-26. The numbers, including the difference
between the two sets, are expressed as annual
averages across the decade.
The results, as shown in Table 2, are very clear. 
All four main components of demographic change
contribute to the lowering of London’s projected
population growth for 2016-26. Compared with the
2014-based series for this decade, births are down,
deaths are up, there will be less net immigration
from abroad, and London’s net migration loss to the
rest of the UK is now expected to be greater.
Of the total cutback in projected growth by some
28,300 a year over this decade, the largest element
is the reduction in expected number of births, by
11,200 a year. This is closely followed by the 11,100-
a-year reduction in within-UK migration balance, 
the latter being due both to more people leaving
London and to fewer moving to it. Net immigration
from abroad comes next, with a drop of 3,700 a
year from 2014-based expectations, with the 
smaller number of arrivals in the latest projections
only partially offset by the drop in departures. The
smallest change from the 2014-based series is the
2,300-a-year increase in the number of deaths
projected for the decade.
This leads on to thinking about what lies behind
these changes, which all act negatively on London’s
projected rate of population growth compared with
the 2014-based series – as well as posing questions
about how much confidence can be placed in the
revised set of assumptions responsible for them.
Starting with the number of deaths, this is the
component of change about which there has
traditionally been the greatest certainty about future
trends. Over the last 40 years mortality rates
nationally for both men and women have fallen
consistently, down by 53% and 45%, respectively
since 1976. Since around 2011, however, there has
been little or no improvement in mortality rates,3
which has forced the ONS to make a judgement on
whether this is merely a short-term blip or a real
change of trajectory. As evidence has been mounting
Source: Calculated from ONS data. Numbers may not sum exactly because of rounding
Births
Deaths
Natural change
International immigration 
International emigration
Net international migration
In-migration from UK
Out-migration to UK
Net within-UK
Net all migration
Sum of all components
139.0
48.5
+90.5
180.7
101.6
+79.1
211.6
276.1
-64.5
+14.6
+105.2
127.9
50.8
+77.1
171.4
95.9
+75.4
207.5
283.1
-75.6
-0.2
+76.9
-11.2
+2.3
-13.5
-9.4
-5.7
-3.7
-4.1
+7.0
-11.1
-14.8
-28.3
2014-based
thousands
Annual average
2016-based
thousands
Difference
thousands
Table 2
Comparison of the 2014-based and the 2016-based projections of London’s population
change for the decade 2016-26, by demographic component – annual average
Component
of change
in favour of the latter, the ONS and its expert panel
have trimmed life expectancy in 2041 by a full year,
dropping the figure for males from 84.6 to 83.6
years and that for females from 87.4 to 86.4 years.4
These are the figures for England as a whole, but
the scale of the reduction will be very similar across
the country, including London.
Turning to the 11,200-a-year reduction in the
projected number of births for London for 2016-26,
the main explanation can again be found in the
national level projections. Basically, recent trends
suggest that women will be having fewer children 
in future than was believed when the 2014-based
projections were being prepared. For England, the
total fertility rate (broadly the average number of
births per woman) was put at 1.90 then, but this 
has now been reduced to 1.85.
In addition, in the case of births there is a further
place-specific factor helping to reduce the total
number of births expected – namely the difference
from the 2014-based projections in the size and
composition of London’s population. Slower overall
population growth than previously expected means
fewer potential mothers. This impact of this is
compounded by the effect of the changes in
migration between the two sets of projections
shown in Table 2. With the inflow to London being
dominated by 16-29 year olds, a reduction in this
means a smaller supply of potential mothers, while
the acceleration of outward movement will remove
more of them, as the exodus from London is
concentrated in ages up to the 40s. As regards
London’s gains from international migration, they are
mainly of people in their 20s and 30s, so a lowering
of these numbers in the new projections also directly
affects the size of the main child-bearing groups.
What this means, of course, is that London’s
projected number of births is sensitive – albeit to a
much smaller degree than how accurate the fertility
assumptions prove to be – to whether or not the
two sets of migration assumptions turn out to be
correct. The rest of this article focuses on these.
Looking first at international migration, the main
change from the 2014-based series is again a national
one.4 The ONS is now assuming that the UK’s long-
term level of net immigration from abroad (applying
from year 7 of the projection period onwards) will
be 165,000 rather than 185,000, with the preceding
six years involving a set of rather sharp downward
steps from the 335,000 estimated for 2015-16. In
addition, the new projections incorporate some
methodological developments, most importantly
one that aims to provide a more accurate estimate
of emigration. The combined outcome for London is
that its long-term net gain from abroad is now set at
67,600 a year, which represents a substantial drop
from the 114,225 estimated for 2015-16.
As regards migration between London and the
rest of the UK, what explains the acceleration in the
capital’s net exodus between the 2014- and 2016-
based projections shown in Table 2? The answer lies
in the ONS basing its assumptions on the average
of the migration rates observed over the latest five
years.5 Thus for the latest projections this refers to
the period from mid-2011 to mid-2016, whereas 
for the 2014-based set the reference period was
mid-2009 to mid-2014. The reason why this shift in
the window makes such a big difference is that
London’s within-UK migration is rather sensitive to
the state of the economy, and the new window is
now two years further away from the 2008-09
recession.
As documented by much research, most recently
by a report on migration in the Wider South East
commissioned by the East of England Local
Government Association (EELGA),6 London’s net
exodus is at its lowest point during a national
downturn and then picks up again during the
subsequent recovery. While seemingly paradoxical,
this pattern arises mainly from the fact that those
intending to move out of the capital are less able
and/or willing to do so when their jobs may be
threatened and the housing market is in the
doldrums. A contributory factor is that London’s
inflow does not fluctuate as much because it is
dominated by young adults and especially recent
graduates, whose numbers nationally do not alter
much in the short term and who regard London as
the best bet for jobs, even in a recession.
These changes in London’s expected migration
between the 2014- and 2016-based projections play
a key role in the reduction in the capital’s expected
population growth, as seen in Table 2; so how much
confidence can be placed in the new figures?
It is very difficult to give a definitive answer in
relation to international migration, because this has
become the most unpredictable component of
population change – taking over from fertility, which
once provided the major upsets and even now
remains relatively volatile, as shown above. This
uncertainty arises partly because, despite the ONS’s
recent improvements in its monitoring, the latter is
still heavily reliant on small samples of data derived
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‘The changes in London’s
expected migration between
the 2014- and 2016-based
projections play a key role in
the reduction in the capital’s
expected population growth;
so how much confidence can
be placed in the new figures?’
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from the International Passenger Survey, resulting in
big swings in annual numbers and wide confidence
ranges. But it is also arises from substantial real
fluctuations that reflect changes over time in labour
demand and the nature and effectiveness of
admissions policy, along with variation from year 
to year in the scale of asylum-seeking.
Perhaps the most that can be said at this juncture
is that the ONS’s continued practice of scaling
down the numbers of immigrants over the first six
years of the projection to a long-term level well
below that observed in the immediate run-up to the
base year has thus far proved to be a long way off
the mark, but perhaps things will be different this
time with Brexit.
Turning to London’s migration exchanges with the
rest of the UK, there are two main worries about
the ONS’s approach. One concerns the projections
methodology not including any direct link between
within-UK and international migration, despite the
fact that there is now much evidence of a correlation
between the two. As documented in the EELGA
report,6 it is not just the state of the economy that
affects the net exodus from London but also changes
in the volume of the capital’s net gain from abroad:
when the latter rises, so does London’s net loss to
the rest of UK in a type of ‘displacement’ process.
As a result, any reduction in London’s assumed net
gain from abroad – as indicated by comparing the
2014- and 2016-based projections – would be
expected to reduce the scale of this effect and lead
to less pressure for overspill out of London, but this
is not allowed for in the projection process.
The other issue relates to the ONS’s practice of
averaging the rates for the latest five years of
records to form the basis for the next 25 years. 
As mentioned above, London’s net out-migration
fluctuates considerably over time, so the choice of
calibration period is crucial.
This is illustrated in Fig. 1, which shows the net
exodus peaking at some 110,000 in 2003/04, then
reducing fairly steadily to 32,000 at the height of 
the recession in 2008/09 and subsequently moving
back towards the earlier peak. The horizontal lines
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Fig. 1  London’s net migration balance with the rest of the UK, 2001-16, with annual averages for selected periods
‘Any reduction in London’s
assumed net gain from abroad
– as indicated by comparing
the 2014- and 2016-based
projections – would be expected
to reduce the scale of
‘displacement’ and lead to less
pressure for overspill out of
London, but this is not allowed
for in the projection process’
indicate the average annual volume for alternative
calibration periods. That for the five years used for the
2016-based projections comes to 69,200, whereas
that for the previous set was 51,600. By contrast, if
the reference period was extended to ten years –
which is the length of time that the Greater London
Authority2 uses as the basis for its ‘central projection’
(the others being five and 15 years) – then the average
annual rate lies between these two, at an average
annual net loss of 60,600 to the rest of the UK.
The fact that moving the five-year window forward
by just two years can alter the ONS’s projection of
London’s net exodus by as much as 17,600 a year
makes a strong case for adopting a longer period
that spans short-term economic oscillations more
fully. Nevertheless, in the present case the five-year
average to 2016 looks more plausible than the five-
year one to 2014, in that it runs pretty close to the
average of the first ten years from 2001, with the
annual net loss being higher than the 69,200 mark
until 2006-07, and then lower than it for the next
four years. But clearly, in principle, a longer
calibration period would inspire more confidence.
Finally, and leading on from this, the raising of
London’s net out-migration to the rest of the UK
between the two projections has impacts on 
the net balances of the rest of the country. The
difference between the 2014- and 2016-based
projections for the net within-UK migration balances
for each English region is shown in Fig. 2, with the
total 2016-26 difference for London amounting to
111,000, as previously indicated in Table 2. What is
particularly noteworthy from this chart is that the
impact of this projected greater out-migration from
the capital is not being felt by the two adjacent
regions of the South East and East, at least not in
these net terms – indeed, these two regions are,
like London, also expected to have a less positive
migration balance than projected for this decade 
by the 2014-based set. Instead, it is the rest of the
country that sees faster population growth from 
this source in the 2016-based projections, with all
the other regions taking a share of the extra net
out-migration from the three regions of the Wider
South East.
But will this turn out to be the case? Again, the
issue revolves around the use of the five-year
calibration period, as it did for anticipating the future
level of London’s overall net exodus; but the verdict
here is rather different. This is because the exodus’s
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Fig. 2  Difference between 2014- and 2016-based projections of within-UK migration balance for 2016-26, by region 
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geographical impact varies through the business
cycle, even between the early and later stages of 
a recovery.
As documented in the EELGA report,6 the initial
impact of a London-led recovery is obviously
experienced by the capital itself and the areas
immediately surrounding it, but as pressures build
up there, then the effects are felt further afield – a
process most commonly spoken of in terms of 
the ‘house-price ripple’. This moves out across the
country, so cannot be expected to remain in place
until 2026, let alone 2041. It thus reinforces the
case for basing sub-national population projections
on a longer reference period, but in the meantime it
also means that caution must be exercised in using
these latest population projections as a basis for
informing policy-making and planning decisions.
In a nutshell, as regards within-UK migration, 
the research evidence suggests that the scale of
London’s net exodus indicated by the 2016-based
projections may be closer to the likely outturn than
that of the 2014-based set, where the reference
period was dominated by the immediate aftermath
of recession, but the projections of the geographical
distribution of the higher level of gain for the rest of
the country are unlikely to be so robust. There is, of
course, no substitute for closely monitoring events
as they unfold, as is also true for mortality, fertility
and international migration, but the adoption of a
longer calibration period for within-UK migration
would serve to reduce the extent to which the sub-
national projections need adjusting between each
two-yearly round and thereby provide a more robust
basis for planning.
● Tony Champion is Emeritus Professor of Population
Geography at Newcastle University. The views expressed are
personal.
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